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concerning "establish a command exit point program for ENDJRNPF" - i then would trigger an RFE on how to avoid a *SECADM user to modify / change the exit point.
sorry my last comment was not complete. It might be a good approach but in my opinion we should be able to modify this level of security settings to same approach as stopping users from *sec related system values.
We maybe can include Tim Mullenbach into that topic?
The Exit point solution might be a good approach.
IBM does not intend to provide a solution to this request at this time, so it is being closed. As CAAC pointed out, adding new controls won't necessarily stop a malicious user with elevated authority, and could lead to a false sense of security.
One existing solution is to establish a command exit point program for ENDJRNPF or similar commands to monitor and/or restrict the actions of a highly privileged user.
The request to shift the security "problem" from a *SECADM user to a specially enabled DST user may be a regulatory request, as a system may have been configured to have multiple *SECADM but only one specially enabled DST user which has its own password which can be handled by "master-secofr".
The CAAC has reviewed this requirement and recommends that IBM not implement this request. The Use Case mentioned "a malicious *secadm user ", but any user can be malicious. Best practice is to grant appropriate level of authorities to all levels of users. Implementing this RFE would shift the security problem to a different arena instead of solving the problem.
Background: The COMMON Americas Advisory Council (CAAC) members have a broad range of experience in working with small and medium-sized IBM i customers. CAAC has a key role in working with IBM i development to help assess the value and impact of individual RFEs on the broader IBM i community, and has therefore reviewed your RFE.
For more information about CAAC, see www.common.org/caac
For more details about CAAC's role with RFEs, see http://www.ibmsystemsmag.com/Blogs/i-Can/May-2017/COMMON-Americas-Advisory-Council-%28CAAC%29-and-RFEs/
Nancy Uthke-Schmucki - CAAC Program Manager